Atrocities by Corporate Actors: A Historical Perspective by Kelly, Michael J.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 50 | Issue 1
2018
Atrocities by Corporate Actors: A Historical
Perspective
Michael J. Kelly
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Michael J. Kelly, Atrocities by Corporate Actors: A Historical Perspective, 50 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 49 (2018)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol50/iss1/6
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
49 
Atrocities by Corporate Actors: 
A Historical Perspective 
Michael J. Kelly 
Corporations have been around for centuries.  Their entire 
operating principle is to generate profit.  All other purposes are 
ancillary.  However, people within corporations and running 
corporations make decisions for these entities and sometimes 
those decisions lead to criminal conduct in pursuit of that profit 
motive.  History provides several examples of such conduct 
playing out in egregious ways, from the time of the British East 
India Company’s exploitation of the Asian Indian subcontinent 
in support of Great Britain’s colonial expansion to the time of 
I.G. Farben’s exploitation of slave labor during World War II in 
support of German military efforts.  Efforts today to hold 
corporations accountable for international crimes such as 
genocide are informed by these historical examples and 
arguments to finally do something about it are buttressed by 
them as well. 
Corporations have been around a long time—certainly since the 
time of the Roman Empire.1 As long as they have been around, some 
have invariably engaged in egregious conduct in furtherance of their 
central driving animus—profit. While many early corporations were 
formed to carry out the public good, today the vast majority of 
corporations are private entities designed to maximize profit for their 
shareholders.2 A few private companies with medieval origins are still 
in business, in one form or another, and remain engaged in an array 
of economic activity: 
The world’s oldest family business, Kongō Gumi, started to 
build and restore temples in 578 in Japan. Europe’s oldest 
 
 Interim Dean and Professor of Law, Creighton University School of 
Law.  Professor Kelly holds the Senator Allen A. Sekt Endowed Chair in 
Law at Creighton University and serves on the International Board of 
Directors and as President of the U.S. National Section of L’Association 
Internationale de Droit Pénal (AIDP). This article is derived from a 
chapter on historical instances of corporate criminal accountability in 
Dean Kelly’s book, Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide (Oxford 
University Press 2016). 
1. RICHARD D. HARTLEY, CORPORATE CRIME: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 6 
(2008). 
2. See WESLEY B. TRUITT, THE CORPORATION 1-27 (2006) (discussing the 
timelines of various corporations’ origins and their development into 
modern times); MIRIAM F. WEISMANN, CORPORATE CRIME & FINANCIAL 
FRAUD 6 (2012). 
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business is a winery in France, Goulaine, which set up shop 
around the year 1000. The oldest corporation run in a more 
sophisticated way, comparable to large corporations today, is 
Stora Kopparberg, a Swedish mine that was granted a charter 
from King Magnus II of Sweden in 1347.3 
To be sure, corporate business combinations have brought much 
good to the world—both for the people they employ and the skilled 
jobs they create, and for the societies that benefit from their 
innovation and wealth creation. Corporations are the key component 
in capitalist systems. Indeed, the capitalist model, now well proven to 
be the best economic paradigm, is the most widely adopted model, 
and undergirds the entire global economic system. Economic benefits 
would not flow without corporations as a central feature in this 
process. 
Moreover, the vast majority of companies go about their business 
in a very benign way—engaging in the economic activity for which 
they are chartered. However, as is the case with any group of people 
or entities, a few will always choose to take the path of illegal conduct 
that yields large short-term gains at the expense of moral integrity 
and societal well-being. An individual defrauding a bank is no 
different from a corporation defrauding an investor. The first is a 
natural person, the second, an artificial person. Both are answerable 
to the law for their actions. 
This is not a new phenomenon. Criminal conduct has been 
regulated for as long as societies have existed and, most probably, 
even before civilization itself.4 Part of a well-ordered society is a 
general agreement about social conduct that is reflected in the law of 
that society5. Transgressors are punished—whether by a term of 
years, fines, or some other more extreme form. Companies, as citizens 
of these societies, are also potential transgressors. As such, they 
should not escape punishment for wrongdoing. 
This article provides critical historical context for understanding 
the legal treatment of companies that commit such wrongdoing. 
Moreover, the examples explored in this article demonstrate that lack 
of criminal enforcement against such companies as companies cripple 
the effort to seek justice against them.  
 
3. CHRISTIAN STADLER, ENDURING SUCCESS: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE 
HISTORY OF OUTSTANDING CORPORATIONS 6 (2011) (Kongō Gumi 
continues to operate as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Takamatsu 
Corporation, which absorbed it in 2006, and Stora Kipparberg has 
merged with a Finnish firm, Enso Oyj, to form StoraEnso). 
4. MICHAEL J. KELLY, PROSECUTING CORPORATIONS FOR GENOCIDE 16 
(2016).  
5. Id.  
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Section I traces the experience of two early joint ventures—the 
Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company. 
Both were founded as the Dutch and British Empires were expanding 
rapidly into Asia.6 The home powers needed an economic arm to 
develop their far-flung colonies and work cooperatively with national 
military and diplomatic corps that were on site.7 The mission of these 
companies was to establish stable colonial economic units, found new 
profitable trade routes, and secure monopolies on key commodities.8 
The brutality with which both companies pursued these objectives led 
to human rights abuses, slavery, and ultimately, genocide.9 
Eventually, the weight of negative public opinion in the Netherlands 
and Great Britain brought them both down.10 
Section II discusses the role of corporations in the context of 
wartime in the early twentieth century. In both world wars, 
companies were major players furthering the efforts of their home 
states.11 But the German corporations displayed a much more 
egregious callousness toward humanity than other companies in other 
warring states. Developing poison gas for battlefield use in World War 
I, and deploying gas to the extermination camps and openly using 
slave labor in World War II, sets German companies apart from the 
rest generally and the I.G. Farben firm in particular. 
Section III provides the most recent update on civil liability 
within the United States of foreign corporations engaged in tortious 
conduct abroad via the Kiobel case.12 While prosecution of 
corporations for criminal conduct has been possible in the United 
States for the past century, it’s rarely used.13 When it is, the target is 
typically an American firm, not a foreign one.14 The prosecution of 
British Petroleum is a notable exception.15 Cases brought under the 
Alien Tort Statute by foreign plaintiffs against foreign firms for 
atrocities abroad proliferated in the 1990s and the 2012 decision in 
Kiobel are the latest articulation by the U.S. Supreme Court on this 
legal pathway to enforce the law on corporations. 
 
6. Id.  
7. Id.  
8. Id.  
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
11. Id.  
12. Id.  
13. Id.  
14. Id.  
15. Id.  
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In each section, the legal result proves unsatisfactory. Despite 
occasional show trials of individual officers directing unspeakable 
brutality toward native populations, the Dutch and British East India 
Companies were dismantled by parliamentary actions demanded by 
political pressure, not legal resolution.16 The decision not to prosecute 
I.G. Farben and other German companies after the fall of the Third 
Reich was, again, a political decision.17 When postwar trials were 
conducted against individual officers of these firms in the American 
occupation sector, the prosecution was unable in many instances to 
make allegations against each officer stick.18 Had those allegations 
been compounded collectively and alleged against a corporate body, 
they likely would have stuck. Finally, Kiobel significantly narrowed 
the scope of future civil litigation in the United States against foreign 
corporations engaged in atrocities by requiring a new minimum 
contacts test that will make it more difficult to bring such actions.19 
I. Historical Perspective—the Dutch and British 
East India Companies 
History presents multiple examples of atrocities committed or 
aided by corporate entities.20 The largest multinational companies 
during the period of European colonization—the Dutch and British 
East India Companies— rank among the chief corporate culprits. 
Working in tandem with the military forces of their respective home 
governments, these corporations wrought havoc with local populations 
in their colonies on many levels.21 Both were implicated in well-known 
genocides22. 
A. Dutch East India Company 
The Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie; VOC) was considered to be the first international 
mercantile joint stock enterprise and the first multinational 
corporation.23 The VOC was founded by the Estates-General of the 
Netherlands in 1602, and was headed by a group of directors, the 
 
16. Id. at 16-17. 
17. Id. at 17.  
18. Id.  
19. Id. at 16-17. 
20. See Hartley, supra note 1 (outline of history of corporations and their 
connection to atrocities). 
21. Kelly, supra note 4, at 17. 
22. Id. 
23. Lindsay J. Thompson, Colonialism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS 
ETHICS AND SOCIETY, 347, 348–49 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2008). 
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Seventeen Gentlemen.24 The VOC held a Dutch monopoly of trade in 
Asian waters from the Cape of Good Hope onward.25 It was organized 
as a joint stock company formed from several smaller companies. The 
Dutch created a structure of modern colonialism under which 
businessmen would work in conjunction with their home country, 
raising capital for ventures by pooling their individual assets under a 
single company.26 Investors received transferrable shares of stock in 
the company and received profits according to their proportion of 
shares, thus forming an early form of limited liability.27 
This unique joint-stock structure allowed the VOC to be a 
dominant global force for over two centuries.28 Image 1, below, 
demonstrates the scale and reach of VOC operations.  The sheer 
magnitude of the VOC, and the diffusion of liability which initially 
made it powerful, ultimately led to structural and organizational 
deficiencies.29 These internal deficiencies weakened the VOC in the 
face of its competitors, primarily the British East India Company 
(EIC), and ultimately led to the company’s demise.30 The VOC 
eventually declared bankruptcy and was dissolved in 1798.31 
 
24. Lee H. Igel, The Dutch East India Company, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
BUSINESS IN TODAY’S WORLD, 539, 540 (Charles Wankel ed., 2009). 
25. See The Dutch East India Company, COMMITTEE FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTCH CANON, http://entoen.nu/voc/en 
[https://perma.cc/62UT-2EF8] (last visited Mar. 22, 2015) (describing 
creation and history of the VOC). 
26. Kelly, supra note 4, at 17. 
27. Igel, supra note 24, at 539. 
28. Id. See also Thompson, supra note 23, at 349 (noting how the VOC was 
a dominant commercial force for over two centuries until declaring 
bankruptcy). 
29. Thompson, supra note 23, at 349 
30. Igel, supra note 24, at 540. 
31. Thompson, supra note 23, at 349. 
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The VOC was established with the purpose of opening up trade 
to India, Persia, Japan, and eventually China.32 Becoming profitable 
almost instantly, the VOC achieved much of its success through abuse 
of indigenous populations. The VOC “maintain[ed] coercive or 
inequitable relationships with local populations” and was thus able to 
build its business by “buying low and selling high.”33 The VOC was 
also known for establishing its global stronghold by force, carrying on 
Holland’s war with Portugal to establish its initial footholds in the 
East Indies.34 In 1620, the VOC forcibly evicted the English from the 
Banda Islands and captured a monopoly over nutmeg and cloves as 
part of their lucrative spice trade that resulted in the elimination of 
all local trade and the subjugation of local islanders who came under 
Dutch “protection” as the chief source of labor.35 This laid the 
groundwork for the VOC’s first genocidal episode. 
In 1621, the indigenous population of the tiny Banda islands 
decided they no longer were going to participate in this system. 
At which point Jan Pietersz Coen, VOC’s governor-general in 
the region, responded by having them all, to a man, woman and 
 
32. Id. 
33. Igel, supra note 24, at 540. 
34. MARK LEVINE, GENOCIDE IN THE AGE OF THE NATION STATE 243 (2005). 
35. Id. 
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child, exterminated or deported as slaves or ethnic soldiers to 
other islands, with an entirely new indentured population 
shipped in from all over Asia to replace them.36 
In the Batavia Massacre of 1740, the VOC responded to Chinese 
uprisings over sugar prices by confining the Chinese inside the walls of 
Batavia, stripping them of their weapons, and massacring them.37 Ten 
thousand Chinese were killed within the city walls and many more 
outside the city were killed.38 Of the approximately 80,000 Batavian 
Chinese, it is estimated that only around 3,000 survived.39 The Dutch 
then declared an open season on the Chinese of Java, leading to 
massacres in Semarang, Surabaya, and Gresik.40 
The VOC also had substantial involvement in the slave trade.41 
The VOC imported African and Asian slaves to work as laborers and 
servants in their Batavia outpost, their settlement at the Cape of 
Good Hope, the plantations of the Spice Islands of Indonesia, and 
their other trading posts.42 Between 1687 and 1688, there were 
approximately 66,350 slaves in the Dutch Indian Ocean 
Establishments.43 The VOC also transported Indonesian, Indian, and 
Ceylonese slaves.44 
Little information indicates that the VOC was ever reprimanded 
for its human rights abuses, most likely because the corporation 
dissolved before the Dutch outlawed slavery in the Anglo-Netherlands 
Treaty of 1814.45 Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, Adriaan 
Valckenier, was tried for his involvement in the Batavia Massacre, 
but died in prison before the trial completed.46 
 
36. Id. 
37. R. J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 57 (1994). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. A. R. T. Kemasang, Overseas Chinese in Java and Their Liquidation in 
1740, 19 SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 123, 137 (1981). 
41. Richard B. Allen, Satisfying the “Want for Labouring People”: 
European Slave Trading in the Indian Ocean, 1500–1850, 21 J. WORLD 
HIST. 45, 54 (2010). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. PAUL E. LOVEJOY, TRANSFORMATIONS IN SLAVERY: A HISTORY OF 
SLAVERY IN AFRICA 290 (2nd ed. 2000). 
46. A. W. Stellwagen, Valckenier en Van Imhoff [Valckenier and Van 
Imhoff], 9 ELSEVIER’S GEÏLLUSTREERD MAANDSCHRIFT 209, 211 (1895). 
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B. British East India Company 
Great Britain dealt with its colonial possessions in a typically 
paternalistic manner—with various degrees of control over 
governance, diplomacy, defense (both internal and external), and 
economic policy.47 Social and religious policy was left largely to local 
governance.48 Generally, the more the colonial population resembled 
Britain, racially, religiously, and culturally, the more latitude was 
accorded in governance on all sectors.49 The less analogous the local 
population was to Britain, the less discretion was given to local 
governance.50 Consequently, British possessions such as Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand enjoyed much more local control than did 
India, Kenya, or South Africa.51 
European powers engaged in widespread colonial activity during 
and after the Age of Discovery, primarily to harness natural resources, 
labor, and agricultural goods for the benefit of the home country.52 
Britain followed the model of the Dutch in achieving these ends, via a 
close collaboration between the government and a joint-stock 
company. For each major possession, there was a corporation—the 
Hudson’s Bay Company, the African Company (in various forms), the 
South Sea Company, and the East India Company.53 
The British East India Company was the largest of these 
concerns. In his mid-nineteenth-century apology/history of the British 
East India Company, Sir John Kaye tips his hand as to the attitude 
of the company entering India early on: “The servants of the 
Company had been for nearly two centuries regarding the natives of 
India only as so many dark-faced and dark-souled Gentiles, whom it 
was their mission to over-reach in business, and to overcome in 
war.”54 That attitude formed a foundational approach for the 
company doing business in the British Raj that rendered the itinerant 
abuses and atrocities which were, if not foreseeable, at least 
predictable. 
 
47. ANDREW PORTER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: 
VOLUME III: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 8 (2009). 
48. Id. at 222. 
49. See Labbeus R. Wifley, How Great Britain Governs Her Colonies, 9 
Yale L. J. 207, 211 (1900) (justifying these distinctions because of “…an 
enormous native population and a very low type of culture.”). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 33 
(2007). 
53. Kelly, supra note 4, at 200. 
54. JOHN WILLIAM KAYE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EAST INDIA 
COMPANY 2-3 (1853). 
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The British East India Company (EIC) began with 101 London 
merchants who petitioned the Privy Council for a grant of 
incorporation as a “trading company with special privileges.”55 Queen 
Elizabeth I officially created the EIC by grant of a royal charter on 
December 31, 1600, giving the company trading rights east of the 
Cape of Good Hope.56 This charter essentially granted the EIC a 
fifteen-year monopoly on English trade to countries east of the Cape 
of Good Hope and the Strait of Magellan.57 The EIC was a joint-stock 
company made up of 125 shareholders that was administered by a 
governor and 24 directors elected annually.58 The EIC initially had 
difficulty funding its voyages and thus used separate, terminable 
stocks for each voyage where members had the option of subscribing 
or not subscribing to a particular voyage.59 The EIC introduced its 
first long-term joint stock financing in 1613 and switched to an even 
longer-term form in 1621.60 
 
55. KENNETH ANDREWS, TRADE, PLUNDER, AND SETTLEMENT 256 (1984). 
56. Patit Paban, The British East India Company, in Eɴᴄʏᴄʟᴏᴘᴇᴅɪᴀ ᴏf 
Bᴜsɪɴᴇss Eᴛʜɪᴄs ᴀɴᴅ Sᴏᴄɪᴇᴛʏ, 191 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2008). 
57. Andrews, supra note 55, at 261. 
58. Paban, supra note 56, at 191. 
59. Andrews, supra note 55, at 262. 
60. Id. 
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Set against a backdrop of over twenty years of failed attempts by 
Englishmen to re-enter the Orient, the main purpose of the company 
was to open trade in the “East Indias,” and more specifically, to 
obtain a share of the Indonesian pepper and spice market.61 Since 
England was still at war with Spain and Portugal, the EIC made clear 
that its purpose was commerce rather than combat, and initially 
made no attempts to acquire bases or colonies in Asia.62 The EIC’s 
refusal to take spoils from war, a policy that drastically departed from 
that of the Dutch, contributed to the company’s early financial 
difficulties.63 The EIC’s main competitor was the Dutch East India 
Company.64 
Despite its antiwar proclamations, the EIC, from its inception, 
willingly used force to defend itself and accomplish its commercial 
objectives. From its initial arrival in Surat in 1608, the EIC used a 
combination of diplomacy and force to overcome resistance from the 
 
61. Id. at 256, 265.  
62. Id. at 262. 
63. Id. at 262. 
64. Id. at 267. 
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Portuguese and locals, and establish its foothold in India.65 Once the 
EIC entered India, it used a combination of bribery, physical force, 
and commercial efficiency to overcome local merchants.66 The EIC 
built its own ships that were heavily armed, enough to withstand 
opposition from the Portuguese or the VOC.67 Image 2, above, reflects 
the EIC’s dominance of South Asia. 
The EIC’s most egregious and well-known oppressive conduct 
occurred in its administration of affairs in Bengal from 1772 to 1785, 
a system “accused of condoning the exploitation of patronage, the 
abuse of bribery, systematic extortion and oppression of the 
Company’s subjects.”68 Though a supporter of protecting indigenous 
culture, Warren Hastings, the EIC’s governor-general of Bengal 
during the time period, refused to compromise for the sake of peace 
and was known for settling conflicts with “diplomacy, bribery, 
threats, force, audacity, and resolution.”69 While Hastings’ tactics 
proved effective, they also raised significant ethical questions, and his 
achievements were “steeped in controversy.”70 Hastings was also 
accused of draining Bengal’s resources to fund wars to further the 
EIC’s dominance.71 
The EIC’s dominance of the Indian subcontinent was ultimately 
seen as necessary, “driven both by EIC economic interests and the 
idea that to ‘stop is dangerous; to recede ruin.’ From the British 
perspective, defeating India’s armies handily enhanced their 
reputation among local rulers, while defeat or retreat had the opposite 
effect. This meant terrorizing not only the enemy but also local 
populations during battle.”72 The ruthlessness with which the EIC 
achieved that policy rivals both ancient tactics undertaken by 
Genghis Khan in the westward expansion of the Mongol Empire and 
modern tactics undertaken by the Islamic State in the establishment 
of its caliphate from the ruins of Iraq and Syria.73 The key difference 
is that the driving force in the former example was traditional 
imperial aims, the driving force in the latter example is religious 
 
65. Id. at 270-71. 
66. Id. at 274. 
67. Id. at 276. 
68. Chris Monaghan, In Defense of Intrinsic Human Rights: Edmund 
Burke’s Controversial Prosecution of Warren Hastings, Governor-
General of Bengal, 1 LAW, CRIME & HIST. 58, 59 (2011). 
69. Id. at 72. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. DAVID M. CROWE, WAR CRIMES, GENOCIDE, AND JUSTICE: A GLOBAL 
HISTORY 65 (2014). 
73. Kelly, supra note 4, at 23. 
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domination, and the driving force in the EIC example was 
consolidation of economic dominance in furtherance of corporate 
interests.74 
The marriage of EIC control and British military advantage led to 
genocidal conduct against natives, including when “[t]he future Duke 
of Wellington, known for his humanity during the Napoleonic Wars, 
ordered his troops to burn entire villages and loot them completely 
during a campaign in Malabar in 1800.”75 In many cases, the EIC 
wielded its own army “built around a strong cadre of British officers 
and large numbers of Sepoys, who were the backbone of the British 
forces in India.”76 
The EIC also had a significant role in the African slave trade, 
“shipping Madagascar slaves to India and the East Indies.”77 The EIC 
initially used slaves at its Benkulen fort and pepper factory during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, after the “sickly place” resulted 
in the death of many Englishmen.78 The slaves worked fourteen-hour 
days, performing both menial tasks and military functions.79 The 
slaves were housed in a locked brick compound and fed an inferior 
diet.80 The EIC took part in both the East and West African slave 
trade, transporting thousands of slaves.81 
The EIC’s corporate gambit also included drug-running. Without 
the EIC, the Opium Wars would not likely have occurred, as the 
EIC’s heavy involvement in opium trafficking served as the catalyst 
for the conflict.82 Though publicly condemning the opium trade, the 
EIC worked through proxy vessels to smuggle significant amounts of 
opium into China during the early nineteenth century.83  
74. Id. 
75. CROWE, supra note 72, at 65. 
76. Id. 
77. Frenise A. Logan, The British East India Company and African Slavery 
in Benkulen, Sumatra, 1687–1792, 41 J. NEGRO HIST. 339, 339 (1956). 
78. Id. at 340. 
79. Id. at 342-43. 
80. Id. at 343-44. 
81. Britain and the Slave Trade, THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/slavery/pdf/britain-and-the-
trade.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5FY-GX7S] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017); 
see Allen, supra note 41, at 46 (explaining the transportation of slaves 
from 1759 to 1765). 
82. See D.A. Levy, Opium, THE MARITIME HERITAGE PROJECT, 
http://www.maritimeheritage.org/news/opium.html 
[https://perma.cc/L5BZ-VLS6] (last visited Oct. 21, 2017) (stating that 
the EIC controlled the production of opium over the entire Indian 
subcontinent and smuggled mass amounts of opium into China). 
83. Id. 
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The planned addiction of millions of Chinese, engineered by the 
EIC in order to create an opium market it could then supply, was one 
of the more heinous actions taken in the name of profit. But this story 
is actually the story of two addicted societies. By the late eighteenth 
century, England had become addicted to tea, supplied chiefly by 
China: importing 15 million pounds per year by 1785.84 However, the 
only currency China accepted for its tea was silver, of which the 
British had little.85 Spain, the chief supplier of silver coinage, had 
sided with the colonies during the American Revolution and silver 
was still in short supply to Britain.86 So “British traders had to find 
something China wanted as much as the British wanted tea. . . . The 
solution to this predicament lay in opium.”87 Although initially 
resistant to opening this illegal trade for fear that it would undermine 
legal business interests, the EIC soon realized the profit to be made 
by supplying smugglers dwarfed other business opportunities: 
The profits were too enormous for the Company to ignore. It 
sold opium at auction in India for four times the amount it cost 
to grow and process. In 1773, opium earned the Company 
£39,000. Twenty years later, the annual revenue from opium 
sold in China alone had ballooned to £250,000. . . . Between 
1806 and 1809, China paid out seven million Spanish dollars for 
opium.88 
Opium addiction was initially limited to the Chinese upper class, 
as the EIC kept prices artificially high. However, as the Industrial 
Revolution allowed Britain to mass-produce textiles, India became a 
chief market.89 But India was cash poor.90 What it did have was 
opium.91 The solution to this dilemma then, was to widen the opium 
market in China so India could boost opium production to increase its 
cash flow to purchase British textiles.92 The EIC ceased operations by 
the time mass addiction in China reached it full extent and crippled 
 
84. W. TRAVIS HANES III & FRANK SANELLO, OPIUM WARS: THE ADDICTION 
OF ONE EMPIRE AND THE CORRUPTION OF ANOTHER 20 (2002). 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 21.  
87. Id. at 20.  
88. Id. at 21.  
89. Id. at 22. 
90. See id. (stating that to pay for cotton, India needed to sell more 
opium).  
91. Id. at 22. 
92. Id. at 22. 
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the empire.93 Nevertheless, the EIC’s illicit opium trafficking in China 
contributed to the degradation of Chinese society.94 
Despite engaging in various illicit activities and human rights 
abuses, by the early eighteenth century, the EIC had achieved great 
political power and protection from the Crown.95 The EIC received 
little reprimand for its actions because, for political and financial 
reasons, the Crown prevented it from coming under parliamentary 
control.96 When Parliament introduced the India Bill in 1783 in an 
attempt to bring the EIC under its regulation, King George III went 
so far as to say “whoever voted for the India Bill were not only not 
his friends, but he should consider them as his enemies.”97 
Eventually, however, England developed more of a social 
conscience that slowly became aware of egregious conduct in its name 
around the globe. Hastings was impeached for his conduct in Bengal, 
though many critics argue that his behavior was not flagrant enough 
to violate the mores of the time.98 Though Hastings was ultimately 
acquitted, Edmund Burke used his impeachment as an opportunity to 
generate public awareness of the EIC’s corruptness and unethical 
tactics.99 Hasting’s trial lasted from 1788 to 1795, and was a public 
spectacle, with attendance tickets sold to royalty and other famous 
persons.100 Knowing that he lacked the evidence necessary to succeed 
with impeachment, Burke used the opportunity to sway the general 
public with morality rhetoric and turn them against Hastings.101 
The trial represented a new intolerance of Parliament of human 
rights abuses.102 The ethically questionable activities of the EIC also 
spurred other public outcry, such as British protests against the slave 
trade in the seventeenth century.103 The EIC was eventually pulled 
under parliamentary control with the India Act of 1784, which 
created a Board of Control “to exercise political, military, and 
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financial superintendence over British possessions in India.”104 
Aggressive EIC tactics in the lands it controlled continued unabated, 
however. By the middle of the nineteenth century, even members of 
the British Parliament were ascribing torture and murder to the EIC: 
[House of Commons Debate, April 18, 1856, Statement of Mr. 
Murrough (MP-Bridport).] Take, again, the case of the 
Maharanees of Nagpore, which is a case of torture, not, I admit, 
in a violent sense of the word, by the application of the kittee to 
the hands, or powdered chillies to the eyes of these ladies (for 
those are expedients which I believe the hon. Company reserve 
for the extortion of confession or revenue), but torture not less 
acute, because prolonged and mental. On the death of the late 
Maharajah, his widows, in the undoubted exercise of their 
rights, according to Hindoo law, proceeded to nominate his 
infant successor to the vacant gadee, upon which British troops 
marched into Nagpore, threw the Ministers and the relatives of 
the late Sovereign into the common gaol, swept away the 
private property of the widows to the extent of two millions and 
a half, filled the palace of these illustrious ladies with Sepoys, 
under the command of a British officer, and deprived them of 
the means of even exercising the rights of their religion until 
they had extorted from them a release of their legal rights. Sir, 
two of these ladies are now no more—no discussion in this 
House can affect them—whether, borne down by accumulated 
indignities, they perished by poison administered by their own 
hands, or by the servants and at the instance of the Directors, is 
one of those fell mysterious secrets which fiends, both human 
and unearthly, have conspired to consign to the dark archives of 
hell; but be this how it may, the Company are equally their 
murderers.105 
Because the EIC faced severe criticism for failing to prevent the 
Indian Rebellion of 1858, the British government ultimately revoked 
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the EIC’s charter in 1858.106 The EIC was nationalized and the Crown 
took over all Indian possessions and armed forces.107 
II. Recent History—World War I, World War II, and 
I. G. Farben 
When a nation goes to war, everyone is expected to support the 
effort. Natural persons enlist or are drafted into the military, and 
legal persons put their corporate abilities to work for the state. As 
noted in the previous section, early on, corporations became involved 
in the colonization and wartime activities of their home states—
ostensibly in support of national aims, but never at a loss.108 Great 
Britain left most of the work of colonization, and subsequent military 
repression of indigenous populations, to the British East India 
Company during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.109 A 
contemporary in 1827 noted with respect to the British East India 
Company: “A company which carries a sword in one hand and a 
ledger in the other—which maintains armies and retails tea, is a 
contradiction.”110 The Netherlands followed a similar paradigm via the 
Dutch East India Company,111 which supplemented its Asian labor 
force with slaves and forced labor from local colonial populations.112 
In the United States, corporations profited wildly during the 
American Civil War—providing armies in the field with everything 
from weapons to uniforms to food.113 As in the case of modern 
corporate complicity in atrocities such as genocide, the promise of 
large profits with little cost and no negative consequences114 proved 
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too tempting for many companies to resist providing low-cost, low-
quality merchandise: 
Profiteering and fraud were the hallmarks of government 
business during the Civil War. Hasty mobilization, loose 
enforcement, large-scale emergency buys, and lack of 
coordination at the federal level led to a situation very 
attractive to people looking for a quick fortune. J.P. Morgan 
was one example among many. In 1861, before hostilities broke 
out, the government auctioned off 5,000 obsolete and dangerous 
guns. Morgan, through an agent, bought them for $3.50 each. 
He then turned around and sold them as new to General 
Fremont in St. Louis for $22 each. When soldiers tried to fire 
them, they exploded as often as not. . . .115 
This tradition of reliance on corporate support for national 
defense continues today, albeit with better product results. Companies 
like Halliburton and Dyncorp provide both support and security to 
military operations,116 and companies like Raytheon and General 
Dynamics provide matchless weaponry.117 Yet, President Dwight D. 
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Eisenhower eloquently warned the nation and the world of the perils 
of a military-industrial complex that could grow, if unchecked, to 
wield disproportional influence.118 He was describing the emerging 
Cold War synergy between corporations, the military, and the 
government. That synergy cemented itself and has long outlasted the 
conflict it was created to counter. 
Perhaps most tragically, this confluence of corporate activity, 
military need, and government guidance revealed its true terrible 
potential in Hitler’s Germany during World War II. German 
corporations, like those of other countries, operated within a legal 
framework sanctioned by their home government—in this case the 
Third Reich. Consequently, the atrocities they were complicit in 
perpetrating during the Holocaust were legal under German law at 
that time. However, they remained reprehensible and in violation of 
international law. 
At the height of the war one in every five workers supporting the 
economy of the Third Reich was a forced laborer.119 By the beginning 
of 1944, this amounted to 10 million workers—6.5 million of whom 
were civilian forced laborers within Germany, 2.2 million were 
prisoners of war, and 1.3 million were in camps outside Germany 
proper.120 German companies have paid billions of dollars in 
reparations to victims and survivors as a result.121 
Most notably, Germany began to pay reparations to Israel soon 
after the war for the crimes of the Holocaust.122 More recently, 
German industry recognized, in the face of large class-action lawsuits, 
that it must compensate survivors and families of those subjected to 
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forced labor in the German wartime economy.123 First, in 1998, 
Volkswagen created a $12 million fund to compensate slave laborers 
used in its factories during World War II.124 Volkswagen’s action was 
“the first time a German company acknowledged its ‘moral and legal 
responsibility’ to compensate Nazi-era slave laborers.”125 
The following year, faced with similar litigation, over 3,500 
German companies, including Audi, BMW, Krupp, Leica Camera, 
Siemens, Daimler Benz, Volkswagen, Hugo Boss, and Bayer,126 
together with the German government, paid a massive $4.4 billion 
settlement to compensate the victims of their own corporate abuses.127 
A. The I.G. Farben Case 
“Since 1916, eight of the main German chemical firms were joined 
together in what was called ‘a community of interest’—’Interessen 
Gemeinschaften’ or abbreviated ‘I.G.’”128 This community of interest, 
Farben, had “nearly a total monopoly of German chemical production 
at the beginning of World War II and, undoubtedly, was one of the 
main cartels in the world.”129 A supervisory council, the Aufsichtsrat, 
and a board of directors reporting to the Aufsichtsrat, the Vorstand, 
controlled Farben.130 Farben initially took an anti-Nazi position, but 
“when the movement to war was defined, it converted itself into one 
of Hitler’s most powerful allies as the fueling impulse of the German 
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war machine.”131 Farben had made a number of scientific discoveries, 
including the production of synthetic rubber and gasoline from coal, 
which was crucial to the Nazi war plan.132 
Farben played a leading role in Hitler’s war machine, assisting in 
the rearmament of Germany in preparation for the war.133 According 
to an extensive Pentagon study of Farben’s involvement in the war, 
submitted to Congress in 1945, “Without I.G.’s immense production 
facilities, its far-reaching research and world-wide economic power, 
the German war could never have been waged.”134 From the earliest 
days of Hitler’s rise to power in Berlin, his regime colluded with 
members of the Farben board, some of whom were already “ardent 
Nazis.”135 The mutuality of purpose between the Reich and Farben 
first played out in the occupation of forced German occupation of the 
Sudetenland portion of Czechoslovakia. In a telegram transmitted 
between the Reich and Farben “on September 30, 1938, the day of the 
Nazi occupation of Sudetenland . . . I.G. had been promised at least 7 
days before the German troops marched into Czechoslovakia that one 
of its experts would be installed as commissar of the chemical and 
dyestuffs factories of the Sudetenland, factories which I.G. 
subsequently acquired.”136 
After Germany’s defeat, Nazi war criminals were prosecuted 
before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The first 
Military Tribunal prosecuted high-level Nazi leaders. The second 
Tribunal prosecuted Nazi industrialists, including the corporate 
leaders of Farben.137 “All of the defendants [in the Farben case] were 
indicted for the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars 
of aggression, and invasions of other countries (count one); plunder 
and spoliation (count two); slavery and mass murder (count three); 
and common plan of conspiracy (count five).”138 In addition, “[a]ll of 
the defendants, with one exception, were members of the German 
Labor Front, most of them belonged to the Nazi Party, and three 
were additionally indicted for membership in the SS (count four).”139 
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The decision not to prosecute Farben as a company was political, 
not legal: 
Corporate criminal liability—ultimately abandoned at 
Nuremberg in favor of individual liability for owners and 
directors—was seriously explored by the prosecution staff and 
“never rejected as legally unsound,” as legal historian Jonathan 
Bush explains, elaborating that “these theories of liability were 
not adopted, but not because of any legal determination that 
they were impermissible under international law.”140 
A desire to follow the path established by the Jackson prosecution 
team in the first Nuremburg trial may also have informed the decision 
not to prosecute Farben as a corporate entity. “Instead, prosecutors in 
the subsequent proceedings [like the Farben case] made a tactical 
decision to follow the lead of the main IMT tribunal and proceed with 
trials against individuals.”141 
Nuremberg prosecutors could have far more easily  prosecuted 
and convicted the I.G. Farben company as a corporate entity and 
then followed this conviction with individual criminal prosecutions of 
corporate officers on the basis of their participation in the criminal 
schemes once those schemes were established by a conviction of the 
entire company, not on the basis of membership in the company, as 
was the case with prosecutions of Gestapo officers once that 
organization was judged to be a criminal organization. Farben, 
Krupp, and the other German companies that formed the economic 
buttresses of Hitler’s war machine were large corporations but not 
criminal organizations. The results of the Farben trial bear out this 
conclusion. 
Of the 23 accused, 13 were convicted, the other 10 were 
acquitted. None of the accused was found guilty of taking part 
in a war of aggression. There were convictions for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, relating to the plundering and 
spoliation of foreign property and participation in the slave 
labour programme. Compared with the maximum sentences 
foreseen in Control Council Law 10—the death penalty and life 
imprisonment—the sentences imposed, between one and half 
and eight years of imprisonment, were generally felt to be 
moderate. Since the time spent in pre-trial detention was 
deducted from the sentence, most of the convicted were released 
after a few months of detention; the remaining ones were 
granted amnesty in 1951.142 
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Indeed, the decision to go after individual corporate officers 
instead of the company allowed defense attorneys to throw up an 
array of plausible deniability claims mixed with something 
approaching the superior orders defense common in military contexts:  
Former prisoners and British prisoners of war had come to 
Nuremberg, faced direct examination and cross-examination in 
November 1947, and vividly portrayed the brutal reality in the 
camp and at the I.G. Farben construction site. Defense counsel 
had little with which to counter that; ‘the defense attorneys 
limited themselves to relativizing the individual responsibility of 
the accused and to invoking Befehlsnotstand, ‘orders from 
above.’ It was not easy for the prosecution to ascribe individual 
elements of the offense to the agents of the firm. . . .143 
Moreover, the prosecution had to show a much wider base of 
knowledge for each defendant on each count in order to succeed in the 
absence of a prior judicial finding of corporate knowledge—which 
would have eased this burden considerably.144 For example, with 
respect to Count 1, aggressive war, “the Tribunal found that with 
regard to Hitler’s plans neither ‘common knowledge’ nor ‘personal 
knowledge’ on the part of the accused could be established.”145 With 
respect to Count 2, plundering and taking control of foreign 
companies as the Third Reich expanded into Poland, Norway, and 
France, the Tribunal found that while I.G. Farben clearly committed 
all these acts as a company, “there was no proof that all the accused 
had violated international law by participating in these acts in a way 
justifying punishment. While they had all attended the relevant IG 
meetings at which transactions in the occupied territories were 
discussed, only eight of the accused had appropriately been informed 
of the actual course of ‘negotiations’ with the companies and of the 
compulsory methods applied.”146 
With respect to Count 3, I.G. Farben’s involvement in the horrors 
at Auschwitz, individual knowledge, again, proved an insurmountable 
hurdle on the delivery of poison gas charge and the medical 
experiments charge. Although it was clearly established that Farben 
had manufactured Zyklon B, which was used to kill inmates at 
Auschwitz, and had delivered “quite extraordinarily huge quantities of 
the poison” to the SS, “the Tribunal was not convinced that the 
accused really knew about the criminal purpose for which the 
 
143. Id. at 31. 
144. Id. at 32. 
145. Id. at 32. 
146. Id. at 32. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
Atrocities by Corporate Actors 
71 
substance supplied was used.”147 Nor was it persuaded that the 
accused knew anything about the “criminal methods of the camp 
doctors” who were deliberately infecting inmates with the typhoid 
virus and then using Farben drugs for testing on those inmates.148 The 
prosecution cleared the individual knowledge hurdle on the slave labor 
charge, but only because it was undeniable—the fact of slave labor 
was apparent to everyone on site. Farben had specifically  built plants 
next to Auschwitz, depicted in Images 3 and 4 below, in order to 
exploit the available slave labor necessary for plant operations in the 
absence of working-age men who were away fighting the war.149 
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Nevertheless, the Tribunal was sympathetic to the defense 
argument that the accused had no moral choice but to accept the 
slave labor; therefore, it was “excused.”150 
For all counts, and the first two charges in Count 3, the 
prosecution could more easily have shown collective knowledge by 
prosecuting the corporation and then constructive knowledge for the 
individual officers afterward. But as the Tribunal noted in its 
judgment, “the corporate defendant, Farben, is not before the bar of 
this Tribunal and cannot be subjected to criminal penalties in these 
proceedings.”151 Why prosecute individual corporate officers instead of 
the company itself? Some believe the change in political emphasis by 
Washington as it prepared to counter the rising Soviet threat explains 
the shift.152 The decision to treat companies politically rather than 
legally, as noted by Bush above, coincided with an apparent decision 
to put these assets and their personnel at the disposal of a friendly 
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government being built up on the new front line with Russia as a 
result of the “tension of coping with the past and shaping the 
future.”153 
[A]fter the start of investigations and before the conclusion of 
the Farben trial, American foreign policy was undergoing a 
turnabout in its attitude to Germany in general and German 
industry in particular. Under the influence of US Treasury 
Secretary Henry Morgenthau, the original goal was the 
“industrial disarmament” of Germany. Later on, in 1945–46, the 
US Administration adopted the Truman Doctrine, which sought 
to refrain from severe reprisals against the industrialists. 
German industry was not to be “purged”; it was to be recruited 
in view of the new communist enemy coming up on the horizon. 
In the Farben trial, Morgenthau’s ideas of tough dealing with 
representatives of German industry. . . . were conducted by the 
aptly named “Morgenthau boys” [including Farben prosecutor] 
Josiah DuBois, who met with opposition from Washington even 
as main proceedings opened, culminating in the express advice 
from home that convictions for crimes against humanity were to 
be avoided.154 
With respect to the charges in Count 3 (slave labor, poison gas, 
and medical experiments), the prosecution began strong, but failed to 
sway the Tribunal on major points.155 On the slave labor issue, the 
prosecution alleged that Farben not only used inmates of 
concentration camps for labor, but it also mistreated, terrorized, 
tortured, and murdered those inmates.156 The prosecution alleged that 
“through the instrumentality of Farben, and otherwise, [the 
defendants] embraced, adopted, and executed the forced labor policies 
of the Third Reich, thereby becoming accessories to and taking a 
consenting part in the commission of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. . . .”157 Included in the Third Reich’s forced labor policies 
were the following instructions, “All the men must be fed, sheltered 
and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible 
extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure.”158 
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World War II severely depleted Germany’s labor force.159 At the 
same time, the Reich Labor Office forced industries to meet fixed 
production quotas.160 It also controlled the allotment and supervision 
of available labor and prescribed strict regulations regarding the 
relationship between employers and employees. For example, 
“[i]ndustries were prohibited from employing or discharging laborers 
without the approval of the [Reich Labor Office].”161 The defendants 
asserted that these regulations as well as the serious penalties for 
violating the regulations, including confinement in a concentration 
camp or death, forced them to resort to slave labor. They argued that 
they lacked criminal intent.162 
Although the majority of the Tribunal accepted this defense of 
necessity, Judge Paul Herbert stated in his dissent that the evidence 
did not support this defense. He stated, “On the contrary, the record 
shows that Farben willingly cooperated and gladly utilized each new 
source of manpower as it developed.”163 For Judge Herbert, the 
evidence showed that Farben accepted and sought out forced workers, 
including inmates at concentration camps.164 Farben initiated the 
plans to build a new plant at Auschwitz.165 It was not forced to build 
a plant there by the Third Reich. Further, Farben knew from the 
start  that slave labor, including the use of inmates from the 
Auschwitz concentration camp, would be the primary source of labor 
for that project.166 Judge Herbert wrote, “To permit the corporate 
instrumentality to be used as a cloak to insulate the principle 
corporate officers who approved and authorized [that] course of action 
from any criminal responsibility therefore is a leniency in the 
application of principles of criminal responsibility which, in my 
opinion, is without any sound precedent under the most elementary 
concepts of criminal law.”167 
There were a number of documents produced at the Tribunal that 
showed that Farben officials knew slave labor was being used in their 
plants. The defendants “[were] highly cultured, socially-bonded, and 
strongly linked with the highest level of decision-making—a true 
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scientific and managerial aristocracy.”168 Further, the Monowitz 
concentration camp “was surrounded with electrically charged barbed 
wire fence, watchtowers, and guards provided by the SS.”169 It would 
be difficult to believe that Farben officials did not have specific 
knowledge of the use and treatment of concentration camp inmates in 
their own plants. 
On the poison gas and medical experiments issues, the prosecution 
alleged that Farben supplied Nazi officials with poisonous gas used to 
exterminate the inmates at concentration camps.170 Prosecution also 
alleged that Farben supplied Nazi officials with deadly 
pharmaceuticals to use in medical experimentations on inmates of 
concentration camps.171 Although the Tribunal found that Farben did, 
in fact, supply Nazi officials with poisonous gases used to exterminate 
inmates of concentration camps and with pharmaceuticals used in 
medical experimentations on inmates of concentration camps, it held 
that the defendants were not guilty of aiding, abetting, or ordering, or 
even consenting to, these crimes.172 The Tribunal found that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendants had specific 
knowledge of the criminal use of the poisonous gas and 
pharmaceuticals.173 
Farben had a 42.5 percent interest in the firm Degesch, which 
manufactured Zyklon B, a gas widely used as an insecticide before 
World War II.174 The Tribunal stated that “[t]he proof [was] quite 
convincing that large quantities of [Zyklon B] were supplied to the SS 
by Degesch and that it was used in the mass extermination of inmates 
of concentration camps, including Auschwitz.”175 Despite this, the 
Tribunal found that “neither the volume of production nor the fact 
that large shipments were destined to concentration camps would 
alone be sufficient to lead [the Tribunal] to conclude that those who 
knew of such facts must also have had knowledge of the criminal 
purposes to which this substance was being put.”176 The Tribunal 
further noted that there was a “well-known need for insecticides 
wherever large numbers of displaced persons, brought in from widely 
scattered regions, are confined in congested quarters lacking adequate 
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sanitary facilities.”177 The Tribunal thereby found the evidence 
insufficient to establish guilt.178 It found the evidence insufficient to 
show each defendant’s specific knowledge that the gas was actually 
being used to exterminate inmates of the concentration camps.179 
The prosecution alleged that the defendants knowingly supplied 
vaccines and pharmaceuticals to the SS to test the effectiveness of the 
drugs on inmates of concentration camps.180 The prosecution asserted 
that these medical experiments were conducted without the consent of 
the inmates, and resulted in bodily harm and death to a number of 
inmates.181 The Tribunal found “that healthy inmates of concentration 
camps were deliberately infected with typhus against their will and 
that drugs produced by Farben, which were thought to have curative 
value in combating said disease, were administered to such persons by 
way of medical experimentation, as a result of which many of such 
persons died.”182 
Despite this, the Tribunal determined that the evidence did not 
sufficiently establish that the individual defendants were guilty of 
ordering, aiding, abetting, or consenting to these experiments.183 The 
Tribunal noted that defendants could reasonably have assumed that 
the large quantities of drugs shipped to concentration camps were 
used for legitimate purposes.184 The threat of an epidemic of typhus, 
spotted fever, or other similar diseases always exists where a large 
number of people are forced to live in close proximity and in 
unsanitary conditions.185 The Tribunal also found that Farben stopped 
providing drugs to the SS when it began to suspect that the drugs 
were being used improperly.186 
A properly conducted prosecution of Farben as a corporate entity 
would have likely avoided many of these traps. Using a complicity 
standard of knowledge to impute parts of what each individual 
defendant knew to a unified whole on the part of the company could 
have been accomplished through corporate minutes, transactional 
records, and aggressive cross-examination. After establishing that, 
fitting the individual officers into the mosaic of criminal liability 
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would have made much more sense to the bench and painted a more 
complete picture of the entire criminal liability of the company and 
its officers. This would likely have resulted in more convictions on 
more charges against each man. Thus, the relative failure of the 
Farben case ironically makes the case for corporate criminal 
prosecution for genocide. 
In the words of Judge Herbert in his concurrence, “If a single 
individual had combined the knowledge attributable to the corporate 
entity and had engaged in the course of action under the same 
circumstances as that attributable to the corporate entity, it is 
extremely doubtful that a judgment of acquittal could properly be 
entered.”187 Exactly. The company itself was that “single individual” 
that should have been prosecuted. 
III. Modern History—The Kiobel Litigation 
Unfortunately, the tradition of corporate involvement in genocide 
and other human rights violations, as exemplified by the Dutch and 
British East India Companies and I.G. Farben did not end with the 
twentieth century. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company,188 is an 
example of a modern attempt to hold corporations accountable for 
aiding and abetting in human rights abuses, albeit in the civil law 
sense. In Kiobel, petitioners brought claims against two holding 
corporations and their subsidiary under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS),189 for violations of the law of nations. Although the ATS was 
originally designed by the first U.S. Congress to bring claims against 
individuals when British and French citizens in North America needed 
a right of redress in U.S. federal courts, it evolved in modern times to 
include claims against corporations as well.190 
In Kiobel, the petitioners, former residents of Ogoniland, Nigeria, 
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York against the respondents, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company 
and Shell Transport and Trading Company, PLC, holding companies 
incorporated in the Netherlands and England, respectively, and their 
joint subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 
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Ltd. (SPDC).191 The complaint alleged that residents of Ogoniland 
had begun protesting the environmental effects of SPDC’s activities 
and that the respondents recruited the Nigerian government, who 
crushed the demonstrations by looting property and carrying out acts 
of violence, such as rape and murder.192 The complaint further alleged 
that “respondents aided and abetted these atrocities by, among other 
things, providing the Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and 
compensation, as well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use 
respondents’ property as a staging ground for attacks.”193 After these 
attacks, the petitioners moved to the United States, where they were 
granted political asylum and resided as legal residents at the time of 
the suit.194 
The petitioners alleged jurisdiction under the ATS.195 They 
requested relief under customary international law.196 “The ATS 
provides, in full, that ‘[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.’”197 
The petitioners alleged that the “respondents violated the law of 
nations by aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in 
committing (1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) 
torture and cruel treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) 
violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) 
forced exile; and (7) property destruction.”198 The District Court 
dismissed the first, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims, finding that they 
were not supported by the alleged facts. The court denied 
respondents’ motion to dismiss with respect to the remaining claims, 
but certified its order for interlocutory appeal.”199 
Subsequently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined 
that “the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability” and 
thereby dismissed the petitioners’ entire complaint.200 Part of the 
Second Circuit’s holding, however, rested on a misreading of the 
Nuremberg trials; incorrectly conflating the decision not to prosecute 
German corporations after World War II with the legal impossibility 
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of doing so.201 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiori.202 After 
hearing oral arguments, the Court required that the parties address 
an additional issue, “Whether and under what circumstances the 
[ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the 
law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than 
the United States.”203 
This pivotal move by the Court changed the question from 
whether a corporation may be sued at all under the ATS, to whether 
a corporation may be sued under the ATS for acts violating the law of 
nations, committed outside the United States. This made a critical 
difference. If the Court had affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision 
with respect to the former question, it would have completely barred 
one means of holding corporations accountable in the United States 
for egregious human rights violations. “By ruling that the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given international norm does not extend 
to corporations, the Second Circuit majority [in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Circ. 2010) aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 
1659 (2013),] in the words of concurring Judge Leval, ‘deal[t] a 
substantial blow to international law and its undertaking to protect 
fundamental human rights.’”204 That decision would “potentially 
incentiviz[e] states to abdicate state duties to corporations because 
incorporation may effectively insulate all parties—states, armed 
groups, and corporations—from liability.”205 
Rather than address whether corporations may be sued at all 
under the ATS, the Court decided to address whether corporations 
may be sued under the ATS for acts committed outside the territory 
of the United States.206 This implies that corporations may indeed be 
held liable under the ATS.207 In its analysis, the Court first noted that 
“the [ATS] provides district courts with jurisdiction to hear certain 
claims, but does not expressly provide any causes of action.”208 
Rather, “[i]t . . . allows federal courts to recognize certain causes of 
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action based on sufficiently definite norms of international law.”209 
The Court stated that in Kiobel, the issue was not “whether 
petitioners . . . stated a proper claim under the ATS, but whether a 
claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign 
sovereign.”210 
When discerning whether Congress’s statutes apply abroad, courts 
generally apply a presumption against extraterritorial application. 
This presumption against extraterritorial application “provides that 
‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.’”211 The Court reasoned that “[t]his 
presumption ‘serves to protect against unintended clashes between 
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international 
discord.’”212 The Court determined that this presumption against 
extraterritorial application similarly applies to causes of action 
brought under the ATS.213 The Court explained that “the potential 
[foreign policy] implications . . . of recognizing . . . causes [under the 
ATS] should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the 
discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing 
foreign affairs.”214 
A presumption against extraterritorial application may be 
rebutted, however, when the statute manifests a “clear indication of 
extraterritoriality.”215 But the Court found nothing in the language of 
the ATS that evinced a clear intent that the statute had 
extraterritorial reach.216 Further, nothing in the historical background 
surrounding the ATS’s enactment suggested that Congress had clearly 
intended for the statute to have extraterritorial reach. 
At the time of the ATS’s enactment, there were “‘three principal 
offenses against the law of nations’ . . . identified by Blackstone: 
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, 
and piracy.”217 The Court stated that “[t]he first two offenses have no 
necessary extraterritorial application”218 Rather, Blackstone defined 
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both as taking place within the forum nation.219 The first two offenses 
thereby provide no support that Congress intended the ATS to have 
an extraterritorial reach. Piracy, however, generally occurred outside 
the territory of the United States, on the high seas, which are 
typically treated as foreign soil with respect to the presumption 
against extraterritorial application.220 
Although the ATS provides jurisdiction in the United States for 
causes of action against pirates, even when the illegal conduct is 
committed outside the United States, the Court “[did] not think that 
the existence of a cause of action against [pirates was] a sufficient 
basis for concluding that other causes of action under the ATS reach 
conduct that . . . occurs within the territory of another sovereign.”221 
The Court reasoned that pirates do not operate within a specific 
jurisdiction, making them “fair game” for the United States, or any 
other nation, to bring a case against them without triggering negative 
foreign policy consequences.222 Pirates are in their own category, and 
the application of the ATS with respect to them does not imply a 
general intent by Congress for the ATS to apply extraterritorially. 
Additionally, “there is no indication that the ATS was passed to 
make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the 
enforcement of international norms.”223 The Court concluded that “the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the 
ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”224 
Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the facts 
in Kiobel, namely that the respondents’ acts that violated the law of 
nations occurred outside the United States, the Court found 
petitioners’ suit to be barred.225 The Court stated “even where the 
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they 
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.”226 The Court added that “[c]orporations 
are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say 
that mere corporate presence suffices.”227 It thereby affirmed the 
Second Circuit’s dismissal of the petitioners’ complaint, but for very 
different reasons. Thus, conceptually, corporations can still be sued 
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for violations of international law, but the “touch and concern” nexus 
with the United States must be met in order for such cases to 
proceed. 
However, the Court neither explained what factors would 
sufficiently displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application nor what factors would be sufficient to justify an 
extraterritorial reach. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy 
stated that the Court rightfully “[left] open a number of significant 
questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the [ATS].”228 In 
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, he agreed with the Court’s 
holding, but not its reasoning. He noted that the Court’s reliance on 
the presumption against extraterritorial application “offers only 
limited help in deciding the question presented, namely ‘under what 
circumstances the [ATS] . . . allows courts to recognize a cause of 
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the 
territory of a sovereign other than the United States.’”229 The Court 
“makes clear that a statutory claim might sometimes ‘touch and 
concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption.’”230 However, the Court “leaves for another 
day the determination of just when the presumption against 
extraterritoriality might be ‘overcome.’”231 
Justice Breyer stated that rather than rely on the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, he would find jurisdiction under the ATS 
where: “(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant 
is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially 
and adversely affects an important American interest in preventing 
the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free or civil as well as 
criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of 
mankind.”232 
The Court in Kiobel narrowed the scope of claims that may be 
brought under the ATS by applying a presumption against 
extraterritoriality and by putting in place a new test, namely that 
“ATS claims that ‘touch and concern the territory of the United 
States’ with ‘sufficient force’ may overcome the presumption, but 
‘mere corporate presence’ of the kind presented in Kiobel is 
insufficient.”233 But without guidance as to what is sufficient to satisfy 
the “touch and concern” connection with the territory of the United 
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States, it is difficult to predict the effect Kiobel will have on corporate 
liability for violations of the law of nations. Despite this narrowing, 
the ATS still “has the potential to provide a [foreigner] with a civil 
remedy from a U.S. court based upon a variety of customary 
international law violations committed by a foreign national and 
occurring in the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States.”234 This potential would especially be realized if lower courts 
“give full force to the [ATS]’s terms as permitted by Kiobel and not 
reactively assume even that a ‘foreign-cubed’ case (a case with solely 
foreign plaintiffs and defendants and injury in a foreign country) 
cannot itself have sufficient U.S. features to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.”235 
Since the Supreme Court handed down the Kiobel decision, not all 
lower courts have given full force to the ATS. In fact, some courts 
have applied the reach of the ATS narrowly, interpreting the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to be a very difficult barrier to 
overcome.236 Other courts, however, have allowed claims under the 
ATS for acts committed outside the United States.237 The differences 
in lower court decisions reflect the federal courts’ uncertainty in 
interpreting Kiobel and the touch and concern test. The federal courts 
that have addressed the ATS and its extraterritorial reach typically 
fall into one of five camps: 
[T]hose that read Kiobel to require that the law of nations 
violation occur in the United States in order to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality (These courts view the 
law of nations violation as the direct—and, indeed, ultimate—
injury and do not hold that a predicate act giving rise to the 
direct injury could itself constitute a law of nations violation.); 
those that read the case to require that only relevant conduct 
(as distinguished from the law of nations violation) occur in the 
United States in order to displace the presumption; those that 
read the case to allow U.S. citizenship (or residency) to displace 
the presumption; those that read the case to disallow U.S. 
citizenship to displace the presumption; and those that read the 
case to acknowledge that only Congress can displace a statute’s 
presumption against extraterritoriality.238 
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In addressing the ATS’s extraterritorial reach, the courts also 
differ in their interpretation of the touch and concern test.239 In fact, 
some courts did not even address it.240 These differing court opinions 
“show the need for a coherent test to determine when the 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of a statute 
should be displaced.”241 The following cases demonstrate how the nine 
circuits have addressed the issue of the ATS’s extraterritorial reach. 
In Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc.,242 “[o]ver four 
thousand Colombians brought actions against Appellant Chiquita 
Brands International, Inc., and Chiquita Fresh North LLC 
(collectively, ‘Chiquita’), alleging claims involving torture, personal 
injury, and death under the Torture Victims Protection Act and the 
[ATS].”243 The alleged acts that violated the law of nations were 
committed in Colombia.244 Because none of the relevant conduct took 
place in the United States, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ case.245 
However, the court did not attempt to explain touch and concern or 
even relevant conduct. “The court seemed to consider only direct 
harm—that which the plaintiffs alleged to have occurred in 
Colombia—to be the kind of harm cognizable by the ATS.”246 The 
court did not consider the plaintiffs’ allegations that Chiquita’s 
activities in the United States were in furtherance of its illegal foreign 
activities, nor did it consider the fact that Chiquita was a corporation 
based in the United States.247 Rather, it simply stated, “There is no 
allegation that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or that any 
other act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS touched or 
concerned the territory of the United States with any force.”248 The 
court maintained a “strict and sole allegiance to the question of the 
location of the direct harm as dispositive of ATS jurisdiction.”249 
Similarly, in Balintulo v. Daimler AG,250 the court barred the 
plaintiffs’ claims under the ATS, but did not provide any explanation  
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with respect to touch and concern or relevant conduct. Balintulo 
involved putative class-action suits brought on behalf of victims of 
South African apartheid.251 
[T]he plaintiffs assert[ed] that the South African subsidiary 
companies of the named corporate defendants—Daimler, Ford, 
and IBM (the “defendants”)—aided and abetted violations of 
customary international law committed by the South African 
government . . . [by] s[elling] cars and computers to the South 
African government, thus facilitating the apartheid regime’s 
innumerable race-based depredations and injustices, including 
rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings.”252 
The court found that “federal courts may not, under the ATS, 
recognize common-law causes of action for conduct occurring in the 
territory of another sovereign”253 and the plaintiffs’ claims were 
thereby barred.254 The court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ arguments 
that “whether the relevant conduct occurred abroad is simply one 
prong of a multi-factor test, and the ATS still reaches extraterritorial 
conduct when the defendant is an American national.”255 The court 
opined, “[I]f all the relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply 
the end of the matter under Kiobel.”256 
For both the Eleventh Circuit and the Second Circuit, the 
dispositive fact was that the acts in violation of the law of nations 
occurred outside the United States. The courts in Cardona and 
Balintulo determined that they were bound by Kiobel’s holding and 
that claims brought under the ATS are barred if the “relevant 
conduct” occurred outside the United States. However, neither court 
elaborated on what “relevant conduct” is. The courts also determined 
that mere corporate citizenship was not enough to bring an action 
under the ATS when the “relevant conduct” occurred outside the 
United States. “Such a conclusion, in part, rejects the opportunity to 
fully engage the question of the ATS’s reach, inclusive of determining 
why corporate citizenship is insufficient to displace the presumption, 
if that is indeed the view of the court.”257 The Kiobel decision left 
room “for a definition of touch and concern that includes relevant 
conduct, ranging from conduct that is material to a customary 
 
251. Id. at 175.  
252. Id. 179–80. 
253. Id. at 181. 
254. Id. at 193.  
255. Id. at 189. 
256. Id. at 190. 
257. Doyle, supra note 208, at 458. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
Atrocities by Corporate Actors 
86 
international law violation to the customary international law 
violation itself, given the significance placed on the location of all 
material conduct at international law.”258 The Kiobel decision also left 
room “for a touch and concern test that includes corporate 
citizenship, given the significance placed on nationality at 
international law.”259 This was room that the Eleventh Circuit and 
Second Circuit chose not to take. 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted Kiobel similarly to the Eleventh 
Circuit and Second Circuit. In Mujica v. AirScan, Inc.,260 the 
plaintiffs brought a suit against American corporations for their 
involvement in a bombing in Colombia.261 The court concluded that 
“Plaintiffs’ ATS claims against Defendants [were] based solely on 
conduct that occurred in Colombia, and the only nexus with the 
United States that Plaintiffs allege is the fact that both Defendants 
[were] U.S. corporations.”262 The court held that “[the plaintiffs’] ATS 
claims [did] not touch and concern the territory of the United States 
‘with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application . . . and that they must be dismissed.’”263 
The Sixth Circuit would likely interpret Kiobel similarly. In Mwangi 
v. Bush,264 a Kentucky district court noted that because all of the 
relevant conduct alleged in the complaint occurred in Kenya, the 
court lacked jurisdiction under the ATS.265 
The Fourth Circuit interpreted Kiobel differently from the 
Eleventh Circuit and Second Circuit. In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier 
Technology, Inc.,266 the plaintiffs, foreign nationals, brought suit 
under the ATS against CACI Premier Technology, Inc. (CACI), an 
American corporation, “for the torture and mistreatment of foreign 
nationals at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.”267 The court held that 
the Kiobel decision did not bar the plaintiffs from bringing their 
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claims under the ATS.268 The court applied a fact-based analysis, in 
which it noted that the Court in Kiobel “stated that the claims, 
rather than the alleged tortious conduct, must touch and concern 
United States territory with sufficient force, suggesting that courts 
must consider all the facts that give rise to the ATS claims, including 
the parties’ identities and their relationship to the causes of action.”269 
The court also noted that in cases involving substantial ties to the 
United States, “it is not sufficient merely to say that because the 
actual injuries were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch and 
concern United States territory.”270 
In Al Shimari, the plaintiffs alleged that the acts of torture were 
committed by American citizens employed by an American 
corporation and that the acts occurred at “a military facility operated 
by United States government personnel.”271 The plaintiffs not only 
alleged that CACI employees committed the acts of torture but also 
that CACI managers knew of the torture, attempted to cover it up, 
and encouraged it.272 The court determined that these facts touched 
and concerned the United States with sufficient force to displace the 
ATS’s presumption against extraterritoriality.273 “By recognizing the 
legal significance of the defendant’s alleged conduct in the United 
States, the courts in Al Shimari . . . advanced two key tenets: (1) 
ATS jurisdiction can be premised on a claim of aiding and abetting a 
customary international law violation, even if the aiding and abetting 
occurs in the United States and the direct injury occurs abroad; and 
(2) aiding and abetting a customary international law violation is 
itself a customary international law violation.”274 Additionally, the 
court took the defendant corporation’s citizenship into consideration 
when determining whether a claim under the ATS touches and 
concerns the United States. 
In the First Circuit, a Massachusetts district court determined 
that a claim may be brought under the ATS when the defendant is an 
American citizen and a substantial part of the conduct occurred in 
the United States. In Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively,275 the 
plaintiff was an organization located in Uganda that advocated for the 
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equal rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex people 
(collectively “LGBTI”).276 The plaintiff brought a law suit, in part 
under the ATS, against the defendant, an American citizen, for 
“help[ing] coordinate, implement, and justify ‘strategies to 
dehumanize, demonize, silence, and further criminalize the LGBTI 
community’ in Uganda.”277 The plaintiff further alleged that although 
the defendant’s acts of discrimination were focused substantially on 
Uganda, he and his illegal acts were based in the United States.278 The 
court found that “the restrictions established in Kiobel on 
extraterritorial application of the ATS [did] not apply to the facts as 
alleged in this case, where Defendant is a citizen of the United States 
and where his offensive conduct is alleged to have occurred, in 
substantial part, within [the United States].”279 
In the Third Circuit Court of Appeals case, Ben-Haim v. 
Neeman,280 the court noted that claims may not be brought under the 
ATS when all of the relevant conduct occurred outside the United 
States.281 The court held that “the conduct that formed the basis of 
the ATS claims [in Ben-Haim] took place in Israel” and the court 
thereby lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims.282 In 
Krishanti v. Rajaratnam,283 a New Jersey district court determined 
that, unlike in Ben-Haim, some of the relevant conduct occurred in 
the United States and the court thereby had subject matter 
jurisdiction.284 In Krishanti, the plaintiffs brought an action against a 
Sri Lankan terrorist organization, a Sri Lankan nongovernmental 
organization, and individual defendants who founded a charitable 
organization that helped fund the terrorist organization, for aiding 
and abetting in crimes against humanity. The court determined that 
because the individual defendants held certain meetings and 
conducted fundraising in United States, and because one of the 
individual defendants was an American citizen, the court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the individual defendants.285 
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The Eight Circuit and Tenth Circuit have not yet ruled on the 
extraterritoriality of the ATS in light of Kiobel. The Fifth Circuit also 
has not ruled directly on the extraterritoriality of the ATS, but it 
stated in dicta that it is doubtful that jurisdiction under the ATS 
may be extended “to a tort committed by a foreign official in a 
foreign country.”286 In the Fifth Circuit, the court held in Murillo v. 
Bain287 that in a case where the relevant conduct and the parties 
involved had nothing to do with the United States, the ATS may not 
be presumed to apply.288 
The variety of approaches, albeit fact-driven, taken by these 
courts to ATS litigation in the wake of Kiobel, indicates unsettled 
waters. The extraterritoriality issue risks promoting forum-shopping 
by prospective plaintiffs if some circuits are viewed as more friendly 
to ATS litigation and more lenient on determining what scenarios 
“touch and concern” the U.S.  If that happens, the Supreme Court 
could intervene once again.  Of course, the danger of further 
intervention by the Supreme Court is the possibility that the justices 
actually take up the question of whether corporations can be subjects 
of litigation at all for ATS purposes, and rule in the negative.  This 
danger calls for further persuasive case law supporting the proposition 
that companies can indeed be prosecuted for genocide.  Logically, if 
corporations can be prosecuted for genocide, they can certainly be 
sued for civil damages in tort. 
Conclusion 
In each of the instances outlined above if the corporation had 
been prosecuted as a corporation, the greater societal need of justice 
being satisfied could have been met. Moreover, with the threat of 
criminal indictment on the table, a deterrent value can be inserted 
into corporate risk assessment decision-making that could effectuate a 
chilling effect, dampening the likelihood of corporate participation or 
complicity in conduct leading to an atrocity.  Until corporations can 
be prosecuted for their criminal conduct under international law and 
in more jurisdictions than those in the common law world, 
corporations will likely continue to be complicit in the most heinous of 
crimes. 
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